Five Issues Overlooked by Samsung Electronics' Bonus Agreement
Bonus is excessive; compensation needs to be redesigned to reflect capital intensity of memory business
A more serious problem than absolute scale is uniform payment. Who is responsible for this?
- Total compensation for DS memory employees W700mn (US$470k) vs. Alphabet US$311k vs. Apple US$139k vs. Micron US$58k
- Memory profits should be attributed to shareholders who bear capex risk
- Samsung top management’s principle that "where there is performance, there is reward" is based on short-term thinking; it is inappropriate for IT companies that require long-term focus
- Capital allocation is the board's responsibility... Let's not interfere. Focus should be on buying back preferred stocks
- Big bonus conflicts with job security; Samsung Electronics management should be given discretion to adjust headcounts
- Both shareholders and employees want a spin-off. We urge Chairman Lee and the board should make a decision
Global companies like JP Morgan, Apple, Alphabet, NVIDIA, and Tesla do not pay bonuses uniformly according to a formula. It is entirely at management discretion. Employees have expectations regarding bonuses, and management communicates with employees by providing guidance at the end of the year, but the authority to decide individual bonuses rests with management. In the private sector, especially in IT companies where innovation is crucial and individual contributions vary greatly, uniform compensation like that of Samsung Electronics for 2026 is virtually nonexistent worldwide. While a compromise prevented a strike and the fact that bonuses, excluding taxes, are distributed in company stock is positive, the preliminary wage and bonus agreement prepared by Samsung Electronics' labor union and management has many issues.
1. The Absolute Scale of Bonuses is Excessive: It overlooks the characteristics of capital-intensive industries
Profits from the DS Memory division should be attributed to shareholders who bear the risks associated with large-scale capital investments. It is necessary to correct the excessive payments made to employees.The core value of the memory industry is bold capex. During Chairman KH Lee's time, Samsung Electronics enjoyed an overwhelming first-mover advantage because it made aggressive capex during downturn while others were cautious. Capital-intensive industries should have different business models and compensation systems compared to knowledge-intensive software and AI sectors, which are centered around R&D and personnel. According to the local press, Samsung Electronics' DS division (semiconductors) has made capex of W422 tr over the past 15 years. During this period, the DS division achieved sales of W1,046 tr and an OP of W244 tr. It invested 40% of its sales and 173% of its OP in capex. In contrast, the DX division (smartphones, home appliances, etc.) executed W47 tr in capex during the same period, which accounted for only 2% and 21% of its sales and OP, respectively. Competitor Micron's capex-to-sales ratio last year was similar to that of the Samsung DS division at 43%. In contrast, companies like Apple, NVIDIA, and Alphabet, where software engineers and R&D are the core values, had this ratio at only 3-8%. For these companies, capex is not a core value (although Alphabet has recently seen a surge in AI capex).
2. No one knows the success of capex given cyclicality. The risk lies entirely with the shareholders
Korea, including Samsung Electronics, has one of the most capital-intensive industrial structures in the world, resulting in very high earnings volatility. This is a factor that discounts equity valuation from the shareholders' perspective.
As Professor Han Sang Yi of Korea University argues, shareholders are the ones who must bear the losses if profits do not materialize. Shareholders are the owners of the company and have the legitimate right to receive what is left after paying workers, creditors, and suppliers, taking on the risks. When Samsung Electronics' net profit fell to around W4 tr in 2023, wages were not cut, nor were payments to suppliers recovered. Shareholders, who take the residual claims, also bear the economic losses from the drop in stock prices. This asymmetry is at the core of the capital structure.
The expected compensation of W700 mn (US$470,000) for DS Memory division employees in 2026 (W100 mn base salary + W600 mn bonus) is unprecedented globally. Particularly, an agreement on formula near the peak earnings does not align with common sense. Last year, the median total compensation for employees at Alphabet, which has the world's best IT talent, was US$310,000. Based on the median total compensation for 2025, Apple was US$139,000, and NVIDIA was US$301,233.
Micron, which competes directly with Samsung Electronics, had a median compensation of US$58,000 for its 53,000 global employees last year. Even if Micron dramatically doubles its total compensation, it would still be only a quarter of Samsung Electronics’ 2026 estimated figure.
2. Compensation is at Management Discretion: Who is responsible for the faulty compensation system?
A more serious issue than the absolute scale of compensation is uniform payment. Under this agreement, all regular salaried employees under the DS division will receive six figure bonuses, including those in back office. It is contradictory that mid-office clerks and R&D researchers designing advanced ICs receive bonuses at the same percentage of their salaries. Apple states that its compensation policy emphasizes "competitive and equitable compensation" for all global employees based on individual capabilities and contributions. If Samsung Electronics wants to emerge as a respected global company, it should not only take care of domestic employees but also provide fair and competitive compensation to employees at its overseas locations in the U.S., Vietnam, and China etc.
The direct responsibility for this preliminary bonus agreement lies with Je-Yoon Shin, the chair of the board, members of the compensation committee (Chair Shin, Jun-Sung Kim, Hye-Kyung Cho), and co-CEOs (Vice Chairman YoungHyun Jun, President Tae Moon Roh). However, the ultimate responsibility lies with Chairman JY Lee, Hark Kyu Park, President and Head of Corporate Management Office and former Vice Chairman Hyun-ho Jeong.
The Forum pointed out the issues of management that fails to follow the trends of the times and a board lacking expertise and independence in its commentary titled “Three actions for Samsung Electronics JY Lee and his team” in October 2024. If a comprehensive reform of the compensation scheme centered around equity rewards had been carried out early in 2025, this situation could have been prevented. If Chairman Lee's grip is strong and he makes difficult decisions when necessary, he would have reformed the bonus structure last year (when stock prices were at one-sixth of their current level).
The President and Head of Corporate Management Office supports Chairman Lee and is in a position to effectively lead Samsung Electronics and the group. The former Vice Chairman Hyun-ho Jeong was also a non-registered executive, and so is President Hark Kyu Park. Even in the apology published by the Samsung Electronics President’s office in major local newspapers on May 16, while the name of Mauro Porcini, the foreign Chief Design Officer, appeared among the 18 presidents, Park’'s name was missing.
The principle of "where there is performance, there is reward," advocated by the Corporate Management Office, is not suitable for the IT industry, which invests in the future while bearing large-scale risks. Such an opinion is excessive short-termism, in our view. The term "compensation for loss-making divisions" is unpleasant to hear. If the foundry is treated as a loss-making division, who will remain? Most foundry employees were assigned according to company policy, not their own choice. Engineers in Silicon Valley receive similar compensation if they belong to the same company and undergo the same performance evaluations, regardless of which division they are in. Waymo, the autonomous driving business that Alphabet has ambitiously pursued for the past 16 years, has reported cumulative losses in the billions of dollars, yet it is praised as a core business by Alphabet management. Waymo employees receive bonuses in Alphabet Class C stock (GOOG) and are not discriminated against compared to existing Google employees. Recently, Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai received Waymo stock worth US$260mn as part of his bonus at the recent AGM.
3. Capital Allocation is Solely the Role of the Board...Government and other stakeholders should not interfere
The controversy over bonuses at Samsung Electronics has sparked a heated debate about profit distribution. When Minister of Employment and Labor Kim Young-hoon advocated for the distribution of excess profits by large corporations, Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy Kim Jeong-kwan stated on May 29 that "the top priority principle for utilizing corporate profits should be productive reinvestment."
Too many cooks spoil the broth. The direct intervention of Minister of Employment and Labor Kim, who has no experience with private enterprises, especially in the IT industry, has exposed many problems rather than resolving the issue with the preliminary bonus agreement. The decision on how to use the company’s cash flow is entirely the board’s responsibility. From the perspective of total shareholder profit, the board should find the optimal combination of future growth (capex, R&D, and M&A) vs. shareholder returns (dividends, share buybacks). It is hard to believe that the Samsung Electronics board cannot discuss capital allocation properly when even financial holding company boards can do so. Rather than government or National Assembly interference, let’s allow Samsung Electronics’ directors to make their own judgments.
According to securities firms' forecasts, Samsung Electronics will have a significant surplus cash flow over the next three years. The expected free cashflow (FCF), reflecting capex, R&D, and compensation, is projected to be an average of W324 tr per annum from 2026 to 2028. Samsung Electronics decided to maintain its existing shareholder return policy, which utilizes 50% of the FCF generated over the next three years for shareholder returns, despite poor performance in early 2024. The board and management should clearly state that if this policy is maintained, W162 tr (7% of market cap including preferred shares) will be utilized for shareholder returns over the next three years. If the board believes the company's stock is still undervalued, buying back and retiring preferred shares, which are trading at a 34% discount to common stock, should be prioritized.
4. Dramatic Bonuses Conflict with Job Security; Employment flexibility needs to be reviewed for consistency
The approach to bonus issues in Europe and the U.S. is entirely different. In Europe, especially in Germany, the distribution of residual profits is a matter of social consensus. In German corporations, half of the supervisory board (similar to independent directors accounting for a majority of the board in our country) is appointed not by shareholders but by labor unions. In Germany, management boards, similar to our in-house directors, are appointed by supervisory boards.
Initially, the supervisory board is a coalition of shareholders and labor unions, and the distribution of residual profits is naturally decided through consultation between labor and management. However, in Europe and Germany, there is no freedom to dismiss employees, and the extraordinary method of tying bonuses to a certain percentage of OP is not allowed. In the U.S., board members are appointed only at the shareholders' meeting, and directors are representatives of shareholders. The distribution of residual profits is determined from the perspective of maximizing shareholder interests, that is, in terms of capital allocation. It is a matter of selecting the optimal combination of whether to invest in future growth, pay performance bonuses, or distribute dividends to shareholders to maximize shareholder interests. Therefore, bonuses are determined through strict performance evaluations for departments, teams, or individuals that contributed to excess growth, aiming to attract and motivate talents. If a team or individual has extraordinary talent, dramatic bonuses are possible, and RSUs are provided in alignment with shareholder interests.
Because there is freedom to dismiss employees in the US, extraordinary levels of performance compensation are permitted. Employment stability and performance compensation are in conflict. The stronger the employment stability, the more risks are transferred to shareholders. Employment flexibility reduces fixed costs from the perspective of the company and shareholders, thereby lowering the breakeven point and enhancing competitiveness. Therefore, whether European-style or American-style, one must be consistently chosen. Korea’s labor union chooses the European model for employment stability while demanding performance bonuses at even more dramatic levels than in the U.S., engaging in cherry-picking. Samsung Electronics' management has largely accommodated this .This has led to a situation where requests to receive rewards without bearing risks in the distribution of residual profits have been accepted. Consequently, shareholder value is diminished, and this could lead to the "Korea discount", different from controlling shareholders' tyranny and exploitation. Fortunately, Samsung Electronics has avoided the worst by aligning shareholder value with the distribution of its own shares.
5. Both Shareholders and Employees Want a Spin-off. We Urge Chairman Lee Jae-yong and the Board to Make a Decision.
As pointed out in a commentary on May 6th “Samsung Electronics' bonus issue is not just about money; Skin in the game!”, the labor-labor conflict has many aspects that the company has brought upon itself. The problem arises from having various business divisions, such as semiconductors, smartphones, and home appliances, which have different characteristics (growth potential, profitability, capital intensity, etc.), under one roof. There are serious conflicts of interest between semiconductors and smartphones. While controlling shareholders prioritize control, general shareholders find it difficult to understand the complex business structure that leads to equity valuation discounts.
The proper approach is to completely separate divisions with different characteristics and pursue their own growth paths. This has been a long-standing hope of minority shareholders, and now employees also want it. Samsung Electronics is like an aircraft carrier with total assets exceeding W560 tr. For this aircraft carrier, which operates various businesses with different industrial cycles, such as semiconductors, smartphones, home appliances, and displays, to advance at full speed, strong leadership, resolution of conflicts of interest, and alignment of interests must be achieved.
The most ideal scenario is to spin off Samsung Electronics into three holding companies: 1) Semiconductor (ex-Foundry), 2) Foundry, and 3) Consumer, similar to the Samsung Biologics spin-off last October. A "Samsung Semiconductor Holdings" would be established to include all semiconductor divisions except for foundry. A "Foundry Holdings" would contain only the foundry division and be listed simultaneously in Korea and the U.S. A "Samsung Consumer Holdings" would be established to include the DX division and Harman.
It is essential to overcome the contradictions in the ownership structure that prevent proper business opportunities due to concerns about conflicts of interest and to allow the foundry to become self-reliant. Foundry Holdings should appoint independent management and board, and promise significant stock compensation as an incentive. Samsung Consumer Holdings, of which Chairman Lee is particularly interested, may be managed directly by him. In contrast, Samsung Semiconductor Holdings and Foundry Holdings should upgrade to a fully professional management system, and Chairman Lee should be limited to a passive role participating in the board. If necessary, bringing in a foreign CEO should also be considered.
June 2nd, 2026
Korean Corporate Governance Forum
Chairman, Namuh Rhee
Five Issues Overlooked by Samsung Electronics' Bonus Agreement
Bonus is excessive; compensation needs to be redesigned to reflect capital intensity of memory business
A more serious problem than absolute scale is uniform payment. Who is responsible for this?
Global companies like JP Morgan, Apple, Alphabet, NVIDIA, and Tesla do not pay bonuses uniformly according to a formula. It is entirely at management discretion. Employees have expectations regarding bonuses, and management communicates with employees by providing guidance at the end of the year, but the authority to decide individual bonuses rests with management. In the private sector, especially in IT companies where innovation is crucial and individual contributions vary greatly, uniform compensation like that of Samsung Electronics for 2026 is virtually nonexistent worldwide. While a compromise prevented a strike and the fact that bonuses, excluding taxes, are distributed in company stock is positive, the preliminary wage and bonus agreement prepared by Samsung Electronics' labor union and management has many issues.
1. The Absolute Scale of Bonuses is Excessive: It overlooks the characteristics of capital-intensive industries
Profits from the DS Memory division should be attributed to shareholders who bear the risks associated with large-scale capital investments. It is necessary to correct the excessive payments made to employees.The core value of the memory industry is bold capex. During Chairman KH Lee's time, Samsung Electronics enjoyed an overwhelming first-mover advantage because it made aggressive capex during downturn while others were cautious. Capital-intensive industries should have different business models and compensation systems compared to knowledge-intensive software and AI sectors, which are centered around R&D and personnel. According to the local press, Samsung Electronics' DS division (semiconductors) has made capex of W422 tr over the past 15 years. During this period, the DS division achieved sales of W1,046 tr and an OP of W244 tr. It invested 40% of its sales and 173% of its OP in capex. In contrast, the DX division (smartphones, home appliances, etc.) executed W47 tr in capex during the same period, which accounted for only 2% and 21% of its sales and OP, respectively. Competitor Micron's capex-to-sales ratio last year was similar to that of the Samsung DS division at 43%. In contrast, companies like Apple, NVIDIA, and Alphabet, where software engineers and R&D are the core values, had this ratio at only 3-8%. For these companies, capex is not a core value (although Alphabet has recently seen a surge in AI capex).
2. No one knows the success of capex given cyclicality. The risk lies entirely with the shareholders
Korea, including Samsung Electronics, has one of the most capital-intensive industrial structures in the world, resulting in very high earnings volatility. This is a factor that discounts equity valuation from the shareholders' perspective.
As Professor Han Sang Yi of Korea University argues, shareholders are the ones who must bear the losses if profits do not materialize. Shareholders are the owners of the company and have the legitimate right to receive what is left after paying workers, creditors, and suppliers, taking on the risks. When Samsung Electronics' net profit fell to around W4 tr in 2023, wages were not cut, nor were payments to suppliers recovered. Shareholders, who take the residual claims, also bear the economic losses from the drop in stock prices. This asymmetry is at the core of the capital structure.
The expected compensation of W700 mn (US$470,000) for DS Memory division employees in 2026 (W100 mn base salary + W600 mn bonus) is unprecedented globally. Particularly, an agreement on formula near the peak earnings does not align with common sense. Last year, the median total compensation for employees at Alphabet, which has the world's best IT talent, was US$310,000. Based on the median total compensation for 2025, Apple was US$139,000, and NVIDIA was US$301,233.
Micron, which competes directly with Samsung Electronics, had a median compensation of US$58,000 for its 53,000 global employees last year. Even if Micron dramatically doubles its total compensation, it would still be only a quarter of Samsung Electronics’ 2026 estimated figure.
2. Compensation is at Management Discretion: Who is responsible for the faulty compensation system?
A more serious issue than the absolute scale of compensation is uniform payment. Under this agreement, all regular salaried employees under the DS division will receive six figure bonuses, including those in back office. It is contradictory that mid-office clerks and R&D researchers designing advanced ICs receive bonuses at the same percentage of their salaries. Apple states that its compensation policy emphasizes "competitive and equitable compensation" for all global employees based on individual capabilities and contributions. If Samsung Electronics wants to emerge as a respected global company, it should not only take care of domestic employees but also provide fair and competitive compensation to employees at its overseas locations in the U.S., Vietnam, and China etc.
The direct responsibility for this preliminary bonus agreement lies with Je-Yoon Shin, the chair of the board, members of the compensation committee (Chair Shin, Jun-Sung Kim, Hye-Kyung Cho), and co-CEOs (Vice Chairman YoungHyun Jun, President Tae Moon Roh). However, the ultimate responsibility lies with Chairman JY Lee, Hark Kyu Park, President and Head of Corporate Management Office and former Vice Chairman Hyun-ho Jeong.
The Forum pointed out the issues of management that fails to follow the trends of the times and a board lacking expertise and independence in its commentary titled “Three actions for Samsung Electronics JY Lee and his team” in October 2024. If a comprehensive reform of the compensation scheme centered around equity rewards had been carried out early in 2025, this situation could have been prevented. If Chairman Lee's grip is strong and he makes difficult decisions when necessary, he would have reformed the bonus structure last year (when stock prices were at one-sixth of their current level).
The President and Head of Corporate Management Office supports Chairman Lee and is in a position to effectively lead Samsung Electronics and the group. The former Vice Chairman Hyun-ho Jeong was also a non-registered executive, and so is President Hark Kyu Park. Even in the apology published by the Samsung Electronics President’s office in major local newspapers on May 16, while the name of Mauro Porcini, the foreign Chief Design Officer, appeared among the 18 presidents, Park’'s name was missing.
The principle of "where there is performance, there is reward," advocated by the Corporate Management Office, is not suitable for the IT industry, which invests in the future while bearing large-scale risks. Such an opinion is excessive short-termism, in our view. The term "compensation for loss-making divisions" is unpleasant to hear. If the foundry is treated as a loss-making division, who will remain? Most foundry employees were assigned according to company policy, not their own choice. Engineers in Silicon Valley receive similar compensation if they belong to the same company and undergo the same performance evaluations, regardless of which division they are in. Waymo, the autonomous driving business that Alphabet has ambitiously pursued for the past 16 years, has reported cumulative losses in the billions of dollars, yet it is praised as a core business by Alphabet management. Waymo employees receive bonuses in Alphabet Class C stock (GOOG) and are not discriminated against compared to existing Google employees. Recently, Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai received Waymo stock worth US$260mn as part of his bonus at the recent AGM.
3. Capital Allocation is Solely the Role of the Board...Government and other stakeholders should not interfere
The controversy over bonuses at Samsung Electronics has sparked a heated debate about profit distribution. When Minister of Employment and Labor Kim Young-hoon advocated for the distribution of excess profits by large corporations, Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy Kim Jeong-kwan stated on May 29 that "the top priority principle for utilizing corporate profits should be productive reinvestment."
Too many cooks spoil the broth. The direct intervention of Minister of Employment and Labor Kim, who has no experience with private enterprises, especially in the IT industry, has exposed many problems rather than resolving the issue with the preliminary bonus agreement. The decision on how to use the company’s cash flow is entirely the board’s responsibility. From the perspective of total shareholder profit, the board should find the optimal combination of future growth (capex, R&D, and M&A) vs. shareholder returns (dividends, share buybacks). It is hard to believe that the Samsung Electronics board cannot discuss capital allocation properly when even financial holding company boards can do so. Rather than government or National Assembly interference, let’s allow Samsung Electronics’ directors to make their own judgments.
According to securities firms' forecasts, Samsung Electronics will have a significant surplus cash flow over the next three years. The expected free cashflow (FCF), reflecting capex, R&D, and compensation, is projected to be an average of W324 tr per annum from 2026 to 2028. Samsung Electronics decided to maintain its existing shareholder return policy, which utilizes 50% of the FCF generated over the next three years for shareholder returns, despite poor performance in early 2024. The board and management should clearly state that if this policy is maintained, W162 tr (7% of market cap including preferred shares) will be utilized for shareholder returns over the next three years. If the board believes the company's stock is still undervalued, buying back and retiring preferred shares, which are trading at a 34% discount to common stock, should be prioritized.
4. Dramatic Bonuses Conflict with Job Security; Employment flexibility needs to be reviewed for consistency
The approach to bonus issues in Europe and the U.S. is entirely different. In Europe, especially in Germany, the distribution of residual profits is a matter of social consensus. In German corporations, half of the supervisory board (similar to independent directors accounting for a majority of the board in our country) is appointed not by shareholders but by labor unions. In Germany, management boards, similar to our in-house directors, are appointed by supervisory boards.
Initially, the supervisory board is a coalition of shareholders and labor unions, and the distribution of residual profits is naturally decided through consultation between labor and management. However, in Europe and Germany, there is no freedom to dismiss employees, and the extraordinary method of tying bonuses to a certain percentage of OP is not allowed. In the U.S., board members are appointed only at the shareholders' meeting, and directors are representatives of shareholders. The distribution of residual profits is determined from the perspective of maximizing shareholder interests, that is, in terms of capital allocation. It is a matter of selecting the optimal combination of whether to invest in future growth, pay performance bonuses, or distribute dividends to shareholders to maximize shareholder interests. Therefore, bonuses are determined through strict performance evaluations for departments, teams, or individuals that contributed to excess growth, aiming to attract and motivate talents. If a team or individual has extraordinary talent, dramatic bonuses are possible, and RSUs are provided in alignment with shareholder interests.
Because there is freedom to dismiss employees in the US, extraordinary levels of performance compensation are permitted. Employment stability and performance compensation are in conflict. The stronger the employment stability, the more risks are transferred to shareholders. Employment flexibility reduces fixed costs from the perspective of the company and shareholders, thereby lowering the breakeven point and enhancing competitiveness. Therefore, whether European-style or American-style, one must be consistently chosen. Korea’s labor union chooses the European model for employment stability while demanding performance bonuses at even more dramatic levels than in the U.S., engaging in cherry-picking. Samsung Electronics' management has largely accommodated this .This has led to a situation where requests to receive rewards without bearing risks in the distribution of residual profits have been accepted. Consequently, shareholder value is diminished, and this could lead to the "Korea discount", different from controlling shareholders' tyranny and exploitation. Fortunately, Samsung Electronics has avoided the worst by aligning shareholder value with the distribution of its own shares.
5. Both Shareholders and Employees Want a Spin-off. We Urge Chairman Lee Jae-yong and the Board to Make a Decision.
As pointed out in a commentary on May 6th “Samsung Electronics' bonus issue is not just about money; Skin in the game!”, the labor-labor conflict has many aspects that the company has brought upon itself. The problem arises from having various business divisions, such as semiconductors, smartphones, and home appliances, which have different characteristics (growth potential, profitability, capital intensity, etc.), under one roof. There are serious conflicts of interest between semiconductors and smartphones. While controlling shareholders prioritize control, general shareholders find it difficult to understand the complex business structure that leads to equity valuation discounts.
The proper approach is to completely separate divisions with different characteristics and pursue their own growth paths. This has been a long-standing hope of minority shareholders, and now employees also want it. Samsung Electronics is like an aircraft carrier with total assets exceeding W560 tr. For this aircraft carrier, which operates various businesses with different industrial cycles, such as semiconductors, smartphones, home appliances, and displays, to advance at full speed, strong leadership, resolution of conflicts of interest, and alignment of interests must be achieved.
The most ideal scenario is to spin off Samsung Electronics into three holding companies: 1) Semiconductor (ex-Foundry), 2) Foundry, and 3) Consumer, similar to the Samsung Biologics spin-off last October. A "Samsung Semiconductor Holdings" would be established to include all semiconductor divisions except for foundry. A "Foundry Holdings" would contain only the foundry division and be listed simultaneously in Korea and the U.S. A "Samsung Consumer Holdings" would be established to include the DX division and Harman.
It is essential to overcome the contradictions in the ownership structure that prevent proper business opportunities due to concerns about conflicts of interest and to allow the foundry to become self-reliant. Foundry Holdings should appoint independent management and board, and promise significant stock compensation as an incentive. Samsung Consumer Holdings, of which Chairman Lee is particularly interested, may be managed directly by him. In contrast, Samsung Semiconductor Holdings and Foundry Holdings should upgrade to a fully professional management system, and Chairman Lee should be limited to a passive role participating in the board. If necessary, bringing in a foreign CEO should also be considered.
June 2nd, 2026
Korean Corporate Governance Forum
Chairman, Namuh Rhee