Korean Corporate Governance Forum Opinion
Shinhan's “Value-up Plan” receives A0 while Woori gets A-
"Should government lose momentum with Value-up initiatives,
an inductive approach to listed companies could be viable option"
On July 25, Woori Financial and on July 26, Shinhan Financial announced their “Value- up Plans” aimed at enhancing corporate value. Both Shinhan and Woori Financial have outlined clear and achievable long-term goals, earning them A0 and A- grades from our Forum, respectively. Shinhan's slightly higher score can be attributed to its more specific 2027 targets, its fresh commitment to increasing per share value by reducing the number of outstanding shares, and its proactive engagement with all types of investors including local retail investors. All listed companies, including Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG, should pay close attention to this initiative.
If Shinhan and Woori faithfully execute their announced share re-rating plans, they could achieve PBRs of 1.0x and 0.8x, respectively, by 2027 (or in the medium to long term). Currently, their PBRs stand at 0.45x and 0.35x, indicating that a PBR revolution could indeed occur in the Korean stock market over the next 3 to 4 years. Given financial industry is regulated by the government, the success of Shinhan and Woori’s value-up efforts hinges on central government support. Financial regulators should strike a balance between oversight and avoiding excessive intervention in corporate operations. For a management approach centered on “Per-share value” to take root in Korea, the Korean Exchange(KRX) should exclude treasury shares from market capitalization and various metrics calculations as soon as possible. Additionally, the boards of Shinhan and Woori should implement long-term equity incentive plans, such as RSU, to establish alignment among shareholders, management, and the board.
Shinhan's well-thought-out "Value Enhancement Plan" sets a high standard. The board's structured approach of “Planning => Implementation monitoring => Evaluation => Discussion and resolution for plan updates” is something that other listed companies should emulate. As seen in the chart below, “Long-Term Trends of Shinhan Financial's ROE, Market Capitalization, and PBR (2001-2024),” the operating environment for domestic financial institutions is challenging. Shinhan acknowledged that its ROE (9% in 2023) is below the cost of equity (COE) of 10%, citing low shareholder return and uncertainty regarding future ROE improvements as reasons for its PBR remaining at 0.45x despite recent share price rebound. Such candidness is a sign of confidence, in our view. We believe that the target of achieving a 50% shareholder return rate by 2027, primarily through share buybacks, could be brought forward. Meritz Financial's 50% shareholder return rate in 2023 seems to have become the benchmark for all listed financial holding companies. The plan to reduce the number of outstanding shares from 513 million at the end of 2023 to 450 million by 2027 implies a 3% annual reduction in share count over the next 3.5 years. This suggests that Shinhan shareholders could expect an average annual total shareholder return (TSR) exceeding10% in the future.
Long-Term Trends of Shinhan's ROE, Market Capitalization, and PBR (2001-2024)
The reason Shinhan wasn’t awarded an A+ grade is due to relative standing between its board chair and CEO. The chair of the board, who is responsible for appointment and overseeing the management team including CEO, must be independent and should naturally be mentioned before the CEO in official documents. However, in the recent 'Corporate Value Enhancement Plan' and the board composition on the website, Chairman Jin Ok-dong is positioned above Chairman Yoon Jae-won. This reflects a significant reality and the sentiment within Shinhan Financial Group, rather than simply being a matter of loyalty from subordinates. To enhance its independence, the board of directors of financial holding companies, which has often been criticized for being a 'rubber stamp', must take a more assertive role under the leadership of the BoD chairman. This is crucial for improving Shinhan's alphabetical grading. To narrow the gap between Shinhan and KB in terms of market capitalization and PBR, Chairman Yoon Jae-won and the eight external directors need to take the lead.
Woori's medium- to long-term Value-up plan does not specify concrete timeline, but its three main objectives are nearly identical to those of Shinhan: 1) ROE of 10%; 2) Common equity ratio of 13%; 3) Shareholder return rate of 50%. One drawback is the absence of a concrete plan to manage its asset growth. Even top financial institutions in developed countries find it challenging to balance core business, shareholder returns with M&A transactions. Significant industry and deal experiences as well as market acumen are required in this regard. Significant capital allocation to M&A can limit Woori’s ability to buy back and cancel shares. The board and management must carefully consider the impact of future deals on per share metrics and PBR to compete more effectively with KB, Shinhan, and Hana Financial.
July 29th, 2024
Korean Corporate Governance Forum
Chairman, Namuh Rhee
Korean Corporate Governance Forum Opinion
Shinhan's “Value-up Plan” receives A0 while Woori gets A-
"Should government lose momentum with Value-up initiatives,
an inductive approach to listed companies could be viable option"
On July 25, Woori Financial and on July 26, Shinhan Financial announced their “Value- up Plans” aimed at enhancing corporate value. Both Shinhan and Woori Financial have outlined clear and achievable long-term goals, earning them A0 and A- grades from our Forum, respectively. Shinhan's slightly higher score can be attributed to its more specific 2027 targets, its fresh commitment to increasing per share value by reducing the number of outstanding shares, and its proactive engagement with all types of investors including local retail investors. All listed companies, including Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, and LG, should pay close attention to this initiative.
If Shinhan and Woori faithfully execute their announced share re-rating plans, they could achieve PBRs of 1.0x and 0.8x, respectively, by 2027 (or in the medium to long term). Currently, their PBRs stand at 0.45x and 0.35x, indicating that a PBR revolution could indeed occur in the Korean stock market over the next 3 to 4 years. Given financial industry is regulated by the government, the success of Shinhan and Woori’s value-up efforts hinges on central government support. Financial regulators should strike a balance between oversight and avoiding excessive intervention in corporate operations. For a management approach centered on “Per-share value” to take root in Korea, the Korean Exchange(KRX) should exclude treasury shares from market capitalization and various metrics calculations as soon as possible. Additionally, the boards of Shinhan and Woori should implement long-term equity incentive plans, such as RSU, to establish alignment among shareholders, management, and the board.
Shinhan's well-thought-out "Value Enhancement Plan" sets a high standard. The board's structured approach of “Planning => Implementation monitoring => Evaluation => Discussion and resolution for plan updates” is something that other listed companies should emulate. As seen in the chart below, “Long-Term Trends of Shinhan Financial's ROE, Market Capitalization, and PBR (2001-2024),” the operating environment for domestic financial institutions is challenging. Shinhan acknowledged that its ROE (9% in 2023) is below the cost of equity (COE) of 10%, citing low shareholder return and uncertainty regarding future ROE improvements as reasons for its PBR remaining at 0.45x despite recent share price rebound. Such candidness is a sign of confidence, in our view. We believe that the target of achieving a 50% shareholder return rate by 2027, primarily through share buybacks, could be brought forward. Meritz Financial's 50% shareholder return rate in 2023 seems to have become the benchmark for all listed financial holding companies. The plan to reduce the number of outstanding shares from 513 million at the end of 2023 to 450 million by 2027 implies a 3% annual reduction in share count over the next 3.5 years. This suggests that Shinhan shareholders could expect an average annual total shareholder return (TSR) exceeding10% in the future.
Long-Term Trends of Shinhan's ROE, Market Capitalization, and PBR (2001-2024)
The reason Shinhan wasn’t awarded an A+ grade is due to relative standing between its board chair and CEO. The chair of the board, who is responsible for appointment and overseeing the management team including CEO, must be independent and should naturally be mentioned before the CEO in official documents. However, in the recent 'Corporate Value Enhancement Plan' and the board composition on the website, Chairman Jin Ok-dong is positioned above Chairman Yoon Jae-won. This reflects a significant reality and the sentiment within Shinhan Financial Group, rather than simply being a matter of loyalty from subordinates. To enhance its independence, the board of directors of financial holding companies, which has often been criticized for being a 'rubber stamp', must take a more assertive role under the leadership of the BoD chairman. This is crucial for improving Shinhan's alphabetical grading. To narrow the gap between Shinhan and KB in terms of market capitalization and PBR, Chairman Yoon Jae-won and the eight external directors need to take the lead.
Woori's medium- to long-term Value-up plan does not specify concrete timeline, but its three main objectives are nearly identical to those of Shinhan: 1) ROE of 10%; 2) Common equity ratio of 13%; 3) Shareholder return rate of 50%. One drawback is the absence of a concrete plan to manage its asset growth. Even top financial institutions in developed countries find it challenging to balance core business, shareholder returns with M&A transactions. Significant industry and deal experiences as well as market acumen are required in this regard. Significant capital allocation to M&A can limit Woori’s ability to buy back and cancel shares. The board and management must carefully consider the impact of future deals on per share metrics and PBR to compete more effectively with KB, Shinhan, and Hana Financial.
July 29th, 2024
Korean Corporate Governance Forum
Chairman, Namuh Rhee